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IN  R E  W IL L  O F  A LEX A N D R A  L O G G IE 1 
W ill — Trust for Charitable, Religious, Educational or Philanthropic 
Purposes — Precatory Trust — Apportionment
In this ease a problem, both interesting and uniaue in the ease 
law of New Brunswick, was dealt with by M r. Justice Harrison of the 
Chancery Division. T h e  testatrix, after making a number of specific 
legacies, left the residue of her estate (amounting to more than one-half 
million dollars) in the following manner: “All the rest, residue and 
remainder of my Estate I do direct shall be given and applied for charit­
able, religious, educational or philanthropic purposes.” T h e  clause then 
went on to leave this money to trustees with “special Powers of Ap­
pointm ent to allocate the residue of my Estate with full power and 
discretion to them and restricted only in that any and all allocation . . . 
must be for charitablc, religious, educational or philanthropic purposes 
within the Province of New Brunswick............”
In construing this direction (clause 10 of the will), Harrison J. quite 
rightly considered himself bound bv the decision of the House of Lords 
in Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson- and held it to be void for 
uncertainty. T h e  principle underlying the law on this point is that the 
trustees would be within their rights in applving the wnole of the trust 
moneys for philanthropic purposes, a description which does not fall 
within the legal meaning of “charity” . Argument was directed to the 
meaning of the word “or’ , and submissions were made that the testatrix 
merely used the three more particular words as explanatory Of “charit­
ablc” . T o  be more specific, it was argued that the direction should be 
read “charitable, that is, religious, educational or philanthropic” . T h is 
argument, however, was dismissed by Harrison }., who construed the 
“or” as disjunctive and found, as in tlie Chichester case2, that the four 
w ords have each a distinct meaning.
There was here a strong presumption against intestacy, more par­
ticularly since the testatrix haa provided by specific bequests for all of 
her next-of-kin. W ith  this in mind, the Court considered a further 
contention that a precatory trust was created by the second paragraph 
of the clause in question. T h is paragraph reads in part: “W ith ou t re­
stricting the generality of the foregoing special Powers of Appointm ent 
I express the wish that a special Trust, Scholarship or Foundation or 
more than one, if practicable to do so, be established.” Harrison J. agreed 
with this contention and found a precatory trust applicable to part of 
the residue and which was clearly a charitable bequest. His Lordship 
then employed the C ourt’s discretion in apportioning the residue, allow­
ing one-naif for the establishment of the educational foundation and 
one-half for non-charitable objects, which, failing for uncertainty, fell 
to be distributed as in the case of intestacy.
1. Supreme Court of New Brunsw ick, Chancery Division, Harrison J .  January, 1954.
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada granted by the N. B . Suprem e
Court, Appellate Division.
2. 11044 1 A.C. 341.
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In apportioning the fund, the judgment cited as authority 4 Mals- 
bury, 2nd Ed., p. 170, and In re Clarke.:f O n this subject the learned 
editor of Jarman on W ills1 makes some remarks in point. Q uoting from 
In re Coxen5:
W here the am ou n t.ap p licable  to the noil-charitable purpose cannot be 
quantified the trusts, both charitable anti lion-charitable, wholly fail 
because it cannot in such a case be held that any ascertainable part 
of the fund or the income thereof is devoted to charity.
T h is  statem ent, however, was dictum; and In re Clarke:< would seem to 
be the more satisfactory law.
W ith  due respect to \ lr. Justice Harrison, it is submitted that the 
C ourt, in giving effcct to the testatrix’s obvious intention to benefit 
charity, went to the very verge in finding a precatory trust in the words 
used in the will. There is really no such thing as a “precatory trust” . As 
Harrison J. himself, said: “ It is for the Court to determine whether the 
testatrix has expressed her wish in such terms as to impose a binding 
trust.” In view of the use of the words “without restricting the generality 
of the foregoing special Powers of Appointm ent”, it is difficult to 
construe the direction as one which the testatrix intended to be bind­
ing upon her trustees. Clearly, she left a discretion in them as to 
whether or not they should expend the moneys in the establishment of 
an educational foundation.
T h e law on prccatory trusts has been laid down in many eases of 
the highest authority and has been succinctly summed up in In re 
♦Vails0:
1 here is reallv no such thing as a ‘precatory trust’. T h e  language used 
by the testator creates a trust or it docs not. W hether it does so or not 
depends upon the existence of three certainties, viz.:
(1) I hat the settlor intended to constitute a trust binding In law on 
him self or on the person to whom the p ro p em  was given;
(2) I hat he intended to bind definite property by the trust;
(3) I hat he intended to bind definite persons in a definite way . . . 
W hen words of request or desire can be construed by reference to 
the whole instrum ent as imperative a trust is constituted if the other 
certainties are present. If the words cannot be construed as im pera­
tive, there is no trust.
It is suggested that the reference to an educational foundation was 
not something which the testatrix intended the trustees should not fail 
in doing. She left them a clear discretion to deal with the residue as 
they wished (so long as it was expended for charitable, religious, educa­
tional or philanthropic purposes), and they were in no way bound in 
the exercise of their discretion to expend any of the moneys in any 
particular way. T h e next paragraph of the clause in question adds
3. [1923] 2 Ch. 407.
4. 8th Ed.. Vol. I, p. 485.
5. [1948] Ch. 747, at p. 752.
6. il935i, 9 M .P.R. 580, at p. 582 (B axter C. J . ) .
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strength to this view. It reads: “l o r  further direction to Trustees of 
am trust that may be established . . . If the testatrix had intended 
her wish for the establishment of an educational foundation to be im ­
perative, she would not have used the word “mav” here. Rather, she 
would have said, “any of the trusts that are established”, or some such 
phraseology.
T h e whole question might have been resolved bv a consideration 
of the effect of the opening sentence of clause 10: “All the rest, residue 
and remainder of my Estate I do direct shall be given and applied for 
charitable, religious, educational or philanthropic purposes.” T his direc­
tion is obviously void for uncertainty, which means that all the residue 
must fall to be distributed as on intestacy. Any consideration of the 
further provisions, dealing with the administration of this trust, cannot 
affect the overriding intention of the testatrix as evidenced in the above- 
quoted passage. T n e  result of this view would be that all the residue 
would go to tne next-of-kin, notwithstanding the true intention of M rs. 
Loggie to have the bulk of her property devoted to charity. It is subm it­
ted, however, that the rules which guide the courts in cases of this 
nature have been formulated for a purpose, and much mischief could 
result from a relaxation of them.
T . B. Drummie, III Law U . N . B .
M U N IC IP A L IT Y  O F  T H E  C IT Y  AN D  C O U N T Y  O F  
SA IN T JO H N  v. T A Y L O R 1 
Landlord and Tenant Act — Summary Proceedings for Non-Payment 
of Rent — Receipt of Rent After Demand Served 011 
Tenant — Effect on Proceedings
T h e  Municipality of the C ity and County of Saint John let prem­
ises to a tenant who failed to pay the monthly rental of $37 required 
by the lease. He did make sporadic payments. Landlord commenced 
summary proceedings for non-payment of rent under s. 65 of the Land­
lord ana T enant A ct2 by serving upon the tenant a demand for pay­
m ent of the rent amounting to $588 or delivery of possession. T h e  
C ourt found that the landlord had met all the requirements of s. 65(1).
1. Saint Jo h n  County Court (Keirstead Co. Ct. J . )  Unreported. August 24, 1953.
2. R .S .N .B., 1952, c. 126. In 1937 the tw entieth annual meeting of the Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform ity of Legislation in Canada approved a revised Landlord 
and Tenant Act. «Report. Proceedings of the Tw entieth Annual Meeting, p. 16. The 
revised draft appears at pp. 72-101.1 The statute was passed by the Legislative 
Assembly of New Brunsw ick in 1938 with certain modifications in s. 35 respecting 
property liable to dist-ess. (Stats, of N. B ., 193S. c. 42> Parts II and III of the 
Uniform Act received only minor alterations before enactm ent in this Province and 
appear in the latest revision. 'R eport, Proceedings of the Tw entieth Annual M eet­
ing, at pp. 94-981 Farts II and III respectively of the Landlord and Tenant Act pro­
vide summary m ethod; for a landlord to obtain redress against an overholding 
tenant and one whose rent is in arrears. P art III of the Uniform Act is substan­
tially the same as ss. 65 to 67 of the New Brunsw ick Act (Ib id.,  at p. 97; R .S .N .B., 
1952, c. 1261 and its source was ss. 78 and 79 of the Manitoba Landlord and T enant 
Act of 1931 (Report, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting, p. 64. See 
R.S.M ., 1940, c. 112, ss. 78-79. Sim ilar procedure enacted in British  Columbia by the 
Overholding Tenants Act, 1895, c. 53, s. 13. See R .S .B .C ., 1948, c. 174. ss. 29-30).
